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Reading is an area of human cognition which has been studied for decades by psychologists,
education researchers, and artificial intelligence researchers. Yet, there still does not exist a theory
which accurately describes the complete process. We believe that these past attempts fell short due
to an incomplete understanding of the overall task of reading; namely, the complete set of mental
tasks a reasoner must perform to read and the mechanisms that carry out these tasks. We present a
functional theory of the reading process and argue that it represents a coverage of the task. The theory
combines experimental results from psychology, artificial intelligence, education, and linguistics,
along with the insights we have gained from our own research. This greater understanding of
the mental tasks necessary for reading will enable new natural language understanding systems
to be more flexible and more capable than earlier ones. Furthermore, we argue that creativity is
a necessary component of the reading process and must be considered in any theory or system
attempting to describe it. We present a functional theory of creative reading and a novel knowledge
organization scheme that supports the creativity mechanisms. The reading theory is currently being
implemented in the ISAAC (Integrated Story Analysis And Creativity) system, a computer system
which reads science fiction stories.
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We read for a variety of reasons which differ from person to person and range from the straightforward and
well-defined task of information gathering to the more amorphous goal of reading for pleasure. Reading seems
to be tied to most of our day-to-day activities. Perhaps this is why so much interest has been given to the reading
task in artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, and education. Researchers have long been searching for a
theory of reading. While many computer systems have been built to model this process and many theories have
been proposed to explain it, few have come anywhere near succeeding. These earlier attempts failed for a variety
of reasons which can all be traced to the fact that they did not make use of a complete reading theory. This
resulted in these systems focusing on only portions of the problem. Systems which were primarily syntactic in
nature, such as Woods’ ATN systems (1986), did not understand text at a high level of comprehension. Systems
which were successful at levels beyond the syntactic were limited to a small set of researcher generated texts
and were unable to scale up to more realistic problem domains (e.g., BORIS, Dyer, 1983). Other systems (e.g.,
FRUMP, DeJong, 1982) tried for a wide coverage of texts but had to sacrifice high-level reasoning. Each attempt
focused on only a portion of the reading process, all of which were too small to be successful. Comprehension
is made up of numerous tasks which reinforce one another; as a result, focusing on too small an area results in a
theory having to explain too much outside its scope, leading to overload and eventual failure.
We present a functional theory of reading designed to overcome the problems of earlier attempts. It is based
on an analysis of the reading process, the knowledge required for successful reading, and an understanding of
where earlier theories fell short. The theory describes the complete set of functions which a reader must perform
during the comprehension process. Each function is modeled as a task. The various tasks maintain a close
interaction, exchanging information as needed; this integrated approach lessens the burden on any one task. The
theory relies on the huge amount of information available in a normal story; each task is dedicated to gathering
and reasoning about a specific type of information. When one task discovers information, the entire system
benefits. The tasks we have developed are sufficiently broad to describe the reading process as a whole, while
allowing a researcher to see the impact and interestingness of each part, as well as the interactions between them.
We have also focused on an interesting type of reading we call creative reading. We are currently working in
the realm of science fiction short stories, since these offer unique opportunities for this type of comprehension.
The reader must learn enough about an alien world, in a short text, in order to accept it as the background
for the story, and then they must understand the story itself. This is more difficult than understanding a story
with a background that the reader is familiar with. We believe that all reading must contain some element of
creative understanding; the reading process and creativity cannot be separated. Because of this, science fiction
is methodologically a useful domain for reading research due to the fact that most stories will require at least
some creative understanding to take place. We are implementing our theory in the ISAAC (Integrated Story
Analysis And Creativity) system. ISAAC will be a comprehensive reading system; not only will it be able to
read a variety of real texts, it will do so at a level of understanding never before achieved.
2 Reading
2.1 Formal definition of reading
Before continuing the discussion, we need to clarify exactly what we mean by the somewhat fuzzy term reading.
In our research, reading is used to refer to the task of understanding a text of sentences and phrases which are
related in some meaningful way. This text could be a novel, a newspaper article, a set of instructions, or the
back of a cereal box. There are numerous other terms we could have chosen to use: text comprehension, story
understanding, interpretation, reading comprehension, and discourse understanding are just a few well-known
examples. Unfortunately, each of these terms has a set of connotations associated with it; furthermore, these
connotations tend to vary across each discipline interested in studying the process of reading. To avoid possible
confusion, we will use the less-used term reading to describe the overall cognitive task of natural language
understanding.
Formally, we define:
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Text: A set of written sentences and phrases which are connected in some meaningful way to a
common theme (or set of related themes). A text describes a set of scenes and episodes (scenarios)
which are ordered temporally as well as causally. This ordering may be partial and implicit.
Our current definition for text limits its scope to the written word. We would stress, however, that many of
the tasks which we will present will be useful in the understanding of oral communication as well. This is a
hypothesis of ours which is beyond the scope of our current research; we merely wish to clarify the restriction
of written in the definition of text.
Understanding: The process by which a representation (usually tied to an external object)
is transformed into an internal representation (which is usually some abstraction of the original)
within a cognitive agent; while different from the original representation, the new one captures the
salient features of the originally represented object. Successful understanding allows explanation
and prediction to occur.
We can now define reading in terms of the above:
Reading: The cognitive task of understanding a text.
For our particular purposes, the primary internal representation which is built as the result of understanding
a text (the external representation discussed in the definition of understanding) is a set of three interlocking
representations of the text—a representation of the events in the text, a representation of the structure of the text,
and a representation detailing the reader’s own processes that they went through to arrive at an understanding.
One final definition is required:
Creative reading: The task of reading applied to texts containing concepts which are new to
the reader.
Most reading will actually fall within the definition of creative reading; it is rare that all the elements of a
text will be familiar to a reader. In order to read a text, the reader will need to perform creative understanding
(Section 4.2.3) on the novel concepts. This is needed since the reader must understand the novel concepts and
form a coherent interpretation of the text as a whole.
2.2 Example: Men Are Different
Consider the following story, Men Are Different, by Alan Bloch (1963), taken from a collection of short science
fiction tales. The story is representative of several of the issues which a reading system must address.
I’m an archaeologist, and Men are my business. Just the same, I wonder if we’ll ever find out
about Men—I mean really find out what made Man different from us Robots—by digging around
on the dead planets. You see, I lived with a Man once, and I know it isn’t as simple as they told us
back in school.
We have a few records, of course, and Robots like me are filling in some of the gaps, but I think
now that we aren’t really getting anywhere. We know, or at least the historians say we know, that
Men came from a planet called Earth. We know, too, that they rode out bravely from star to star;
and wherever they stopped, they left colonies—Men, Robots, and sometimes both—against their
return. But they never came back.
Those were the shining days of the world. But are we so old now? Men had a bright flame—the
old word is “divine,” I think—that flung them far across the night skies, and we have lost the strands
of the web they wove.
Our scientists tell us that Men were very much like us—and the skeleton of a Man is, to be
sure, almost the same as the skeleton of a Robot, except that it’s made of some calcium compound
instead of titanium. Just the same, there are other differences.
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It was on my last field trip, to one of the inner planets, that I met the Man. He must have been
the last Man in this system, and he’d forgotten how to talk—he’d been alone so long. I planned to
to bring him back with me. Something happened to him, though.
One day, for no reason at all, he complained of the heat. I checked his temperature and decided
that his thermostat circuits were shot. I had a kit of field spares with me, and he was obviously out
of order, so I went to work. I pushed the needle into his neck to operate the cut-off switch, and he
stopped moving, just like a Robot. But when I opened him up he wasn’t the same inside. And when
I put him back together I couldn’t get him running again. Then he sort of weathered away—and by
the time I was ready to come home, about a year later, there was nothing left of him but bones. Yes,
Men are indeed different.
Men... illustrates several aspects of our earlier definition for a text. The sentences and phrases describe
episodes and scenes which are connected in several ways; these include causal (e.g., the robot pushing the
needle into the man’s neck results in the man not moving anymore) and temporal (e.g., the events of the last
two paragraphs occurred earlier in the life of the narrator than the beginning paragraph). Most importantly, the
entire text is concerned with the common theme of misunderstanding the similarity between Men and Robots.
Reading Men... involves transferring the external representation of the text in English into a set of internal
representations which capture the essential aspects of the story. This understanding includes story structure
elements (e.g., the protagonist is a robot archaeologist and the setting is sometime in the future on a planet
different from Earth), scenario elements (e.g., a robot archaeologist found a man and attempted to repair him
when he was “broken”), and metareasoning elements (e.g., when did the reader understand that the narrator was
not human or what the robot was going to do to the man). The reading and understanding of this text is an
episode in itself—an episode of creative reading. The concepts of intelligent robots, the extinction of Mankind,
and interplanetary colonies may all be novel to the reader, especially if the reader is unfamiliar with science
fiction stories.
3 A functional theory of reading
Our theory of reading is a functional one. Any cognitive process may be explained by describing the function of
each of its tasks, the relationships between them, the mechanisms which accomplish the tasks, and the knowledge
which is needed. The resulting functional theory can then be used as a guide to the implementation of a cognitive
model of the process in question. The theory itself does not explicitly tie the researcher to a particular method of
implementation; instead, it describes the process at a higher level, the functional level. Using this methodology,
it is possible to clearly see how a theory is broken into its knowledge components and process components. It
is also easy to see exactly which processes make use of what knowledge in the system; this makes it easier to
understand where the power in the system originates. In addition, it is possible to group related tasks together
into a supertask; this helps identify and model the major cognitive behaviors of the system.
Using the above framework, one can see that what has traditionally been dubbed story understanding by the
AI community is actually a set of interlocking supertasks which combine their abilities to produce a coherent
understanding of a text. Each supertask represents a set of related tasks which together handle an aspect of the
global reading process; it is only the sum of the supertasks which amounts to reading. Earlier story understanding
systems can also be described as operating with a supertask/task breakdown; they simply concentrated on a
specific one. The purpose of CYRUS (Kolodner, 1984), for example, was what we call the memory management
supertask, ATNs were examples of our sentence processing supertask, and AQUA (Ram, 1991) concentrated
on the explanation and reasoning supertask. These systems either ignored the other reading tasks or only
implemented them at a level sufficient to demonstrate the performance of the ones being highlighted.
3.1 The reading task decomposition
We have identified six supertasks necessary for complete textual understanding. Each supertask is made up
of numerous tasks which interact with each other within the confines of the associated supertask. A detailed
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discussion of each supertask follows:
 sentence processing: This supertask is responsible for low-level (mainly intrasentential) understanding,
and includes tasks such as pronoun reference, syntactic parsing, and lexical retrieval. For example,
in the first line of the last paragraph of Men..., a reader must retrieve meanings for the various words
and determine who the “he” is referring to. Other tasks are punctuation analysis, which reasons about
punctuation of phrases; and tense analysis which attempts to discover the text’s tense. In many texts,
low-level understanding issues will prove to be extremely helpful in gaining an overall understanding
of the material. For example, the fact the “Men” is capitalized in the first sentence of Men... signals
the reader that this is something special. Similarly, the italicized “really” in the second sentence is an
emphasis which can aid the reader in understanding what is going on in the story.
 story structure understanding: This supertask handles the details of the text which relate to the story
structure. Tasks include character identification, including protagonist and antagonist; setting identifi-
cation, made up of time and location; plot description, which builds a coherent summary of the story’s
plot; and genre identification, which specifies in which category of text the story is. The inclusion of this
supertask is largely the result of the way in which reading is taught in this country for the types of text
which are most familiar in the Western tradition (Smith, 1986). While this area of the reading process may
not be in-born or even learned at an early age, it does become automatic through our educational system.
As such, it acts as a valuable aid in controlling and focusing the overall reading process. Realizing, for
example, that Men... takes place in the future with a robotic protagonist acting as an archaeologist (in the
truest sense of the word) greatly aids the reader in understanding the story.
 scenario understanding: The tasks making up the scenario understander are the event parser, which
identifies various components such as agents, actions, states, objects, and locations; the agent modeler,
which maintains descriptions of the agents, including their goals, knowledge, and beliefs; and the action
modeler, which maintains descriptions of the acts with which the agents are involved. This supertask
would be used in any experience in which the reasoner had to understand the actions of agents around it.
As such, it is equally useful in day-to-day encounters with other reasoners as it is in the understanding of
text. Generally, texts are intended to relate a scenario to the reader. Men... is not just a story, it tells the
reader about a scenario which could potentially happen. A reader can understand the relationship between
the robot and the Man in the story using some of the same processes which they would in an attempt to
understand the relationship if it was occurring in the physical world.
 explanation and reasoning: This supertask performs high-level reasoning and learning. Creative under-
standing attempts to understand concepts which do not fit the reader’s world view. The unknown word
definer tries to use context clues, root words, and so forth to assign plausible meaning to words not in the
lexicon. Consider a reader who is unfamiliar with the word titanium. Since this word occurs in Men...,
the context will allow the reader to gain some comprehension of the unknown word. Interest management
controls the reader’s level of interest in the story. An avid science fiction fan, for instance, would be more
interested in the example story than a fan of Westerns. Belief management reasons about the beliefs of the
agents involved in the scenario. Did the robot actually believe that the Man was capable of being turned
off? If so, how did it arrive at this erroneous conclusion? These are questions which will be handled by
the belief management task as Men... is being read. The explanation task builds the inferences needed to
connect the events of the story, enabling the reader to learn from the material. Finally, the metareasoning
task reflects on the reader’s own actions during the reading process; this information is also used for
learning.
 memory management: This supertask handles general memory storage and retrieval, including sponta-
neous reminding. It is made up of case building, which constructs the various cases which result from a
reading experience; memory retrieval, which returns information from memory which the system needs;
and memory storage, which places new information and cases into memory. In addition to the conscious
requests to store or retrieve elements in memory, the memory supertask should also handle the unconscious
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storing of material and spontaneous remindings. During the reading of Men..., the reader will constantly
be retrieving and storing concepts related to the material in the text. Some of these may be spontaneous;
for example, the story may trigger memories of other stories which concern the extinction of humankind,
or other stories written by Alan Bloch. Other memory processes will be more deliberate; the reader may
decide, for example, to try to remember the last science fiction story they read about robots.
 metacontrol: Metacontrol integrates the other supertasks. It includes the tasks of focus control, which
manages the depth of reading based on interest and understanding; time management, which allows the
reader to make decisions based on time resources; and suspension of disbelief, which enables a reader
to accept, at least temporarily, a text which violates their world view. This last function is particularly
important in the case of reading a story containing unfamiliar concepts. A rational reader of the Men...
example knows that the story cannot be true. Mankind still exists, space travel doesn’t, and today’s
robots are merely mechanical devices used on assembly lines. In order to read, understand, and enjoy the
story, however, the reader must be willing to accept these unfamiliar ideas for the duration of the reading
experience. Other aspects of metacontrol are important in all reading episodes, whether creative or not.
Readers are cognitive agents involved in numerous ongoing tasks. They must decide how much effort to
expend on each task as a whole, as well as on each part of an individual task. As part of this resource
management, the reader must also decide in how much depth they wish to read the given material. With
Men..., for example, an average reader will not read each and every word; instead, some sections will be
read closely, others will be skimmed, and some may be skipped entirely.
The high-level organization of the six supertasks is illustrated in Figure 1. Natural language text enters
the metacontrol supertask, which directs the other supertasks. The three “primary” supertasks (metacontrol,
scenario understanding, and story structure understanding) produce structures which capture the understanding
of the story (what the reader did to understand the story, what events occurred in the story, and what the structure
of the story was). The three “support” supertasks assist the primary ones in the understanding process.
The supertasks were designed based on functional analyses of introspective reasoning about our own reading
processes, backed up by a significant amount of prior research in the areas of psycholinguistics (e.g., Holbrook
et al., 1992; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983), reading comprehension (e.g., Black & Seifert, 1981; Graesser et al.,
1991), story understanding (e.g., Birnbaum, 1986; Ram, 1991; Rumelhart, 1977), memory (e.g., Kolodner, 1984;
Schank, 1982), and metacognition (e.g., Gavelik & Raphael, 1985; Wellman, 1985; Weinert, 1987; Schneider,
1985). While metacognition is important, many psychological results have shown that humans do not have total
access to internal processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In our model, metacontrol and metareasoning only have
access to supertasks, not to individual tasks. In addition to providing a cognitive model of reading, our task
decomposition allows a straightforward analysis of past systems; most previous systems concentrated on one
particular supertask in our theory, which led to an inability to model the complete reading process.
3.2 The model-driven aspects of the theory
In addition to the modular breakdown of reading tasks, our theory makes use of models to drive the comprehension
process. A model contains knowledge concerning what a supertask should expect from different types of texts;
specific types of models exist for each supertask in our theory. These models allow flexible behavior and the
ability to read from a wide range of texts. Humans learn what to expect from different types of stories; this
knowledge aids them in understanding later stories. To illustrate, if a reader has read a number of books by Alan
Bloch, they will develop a specific story structure model regarding what to expect from the next Bloch story,
or even the next story claiming to be written in the Bloch style. This is in addition to any models which may
exist concerning how to read science fiction or fiction in general. Examples of story structure models include
genre specific models, as well as models describing narrative types (such as first-person, second-person, and
third-person narratives). A similar idea has been proposed by Carpenter and Alterman (1993); in their model,
case-based reasoning is used to drive the reading process which “knows” how various text genres should be read
(e.g., when confronted with a set of complex instructions, skim the first few pages looking for an enumerated
list as these are particularly important to instruction reading).





















Figure 1: Functional model of reading
Scenario models explain different styles of agent interaction. This includes various combinations of “social
states” in communication; for example, the type of interactions one would expect to see between two close
male friends would be very different from the type of interaction exhibited between a boss and an employee in
a formal business setting. Several of these social relations can be seen in Men Are Different: the protagonist
is a peer among the robot archaeologists, it was a student of the historians discussed in the story, and it was a
researcher with respect to the experimental subject (the man). Augmenting the social and interaction models
are models of how agents react in various emotional settings (e.g., if a person receives poor service in a clothing
store he regularly visits). Finally, “local” scenario models exist which describe the more-or-less default results
from an action in a standard setting. At the lowest level, these models are simply the expected results for a
given action and the expected preconditions which may have triggered the action; as such, they allow low-level
inferencing to be performed (Schank et al., 1975). At their highest level, the local scenario models resemble
scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977); they package together a set of expected preconditions and results which exist
in various stereotypical events (such as going to a fast-food restaurant; or, as in the Men... example, the process
of repairing a malfunctioning “device” by using field spares).
Next, sentence models give the capability of dealing with different low level structures. Questions, declarative
sentences, quotations, broken or interrupted speech, and sentence fragments are examples of these types of
models. The reader’s high-level reasoning is guided by the various reasoning models. These control, for
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instance, how much explanation a reasoner may choose to do in a given scenario; if a person’s car breaks
down on the highway, do they immediately try to find help, reason and examine the immediate possible causes,
or attempt to reason the problem through to completion? Metacontrol models allow the reader to tailor their
reading patterns to a given situation. Is the material being read for pleasure, for study, or to kill time? Lastly,
memory models permit different types of memory access to occur based on the text involved. Some situations
may trigger deeper remindings than others. Based on the type of material being read, a reasoner may request the
construction of a careful memory of the material (e.g., studying for a midterm test) or request a more shallow
memory be built (e.g., reading a cereal box for the list of ingredients). These requests would all be handled by
various memory models.
To see the power of these models, consider a reader who realizes that they are dealing with a first-person
science fiction story. They will read it differently than if they think they are dealing with a third-person newspaper
article. The focus in a newspaper article is to build coherent descriptions of events. The reader can expect
the language to be more concise than in a narrative. Also, not as many inferences need to be made since the
purpose of a news article is to inform in a clear manner. With the science fiction story, on the other hand, the
reader must take more of an active role. The story will probably contain concepts which are unfamiliar to the
reader. A reader must decide how much effort they will expend in the attempt to understand these new concepts.
Accurate character models and models of character interaction must be built and maintained if the story is to be
appreciated. The first-person aspect of a story like this lessens the burden of discovering who the protagonist is
and enables the reader to concentrate on other story aspects.
3.3 The metacognitive aspects of the theory
As mentioned earlier, our theory includes mechanisms for metacontrol and metareasoning. This means that a
reader is aware of not only the text being processed, but also of some of the internal workings of their own
cognition during reading. Metacontrol is responsible for the division of labor within the system. Based on the
current interests of the reader, the available cognitive resources, the purpose of the reading episode, and the
difficulty of the text, the metacontrol supertask decides what other supertasks need to be executed and on which
portions of the text. Humans obviously do not read each word of a text to the greatest depth of understanding
possible. No reader, for example, would have the time, memory, and other resources to read every single word
of a story (even a short story) and consider the possible extrapolations and extensions resulting from each.
The reader’s current environment, knowledge, goals and tasks (Ram & Hunter, 1992), and cognitive resources
(e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1992) interact to control the level of understanding which is attempted. Therefore, a
comprehensive theory of the reading process must also explain when and why in-depth reading occurs, as well
as when and why shallow reading, such as skimming or skipping text, occurs.
The metareasoning portion of the theory enables the reader to reflect on their actions during the process.
Remember the last mystery story you read? When did you realize who the killer was? What clues tipped you
off? Did your opinion of the person change as a result; if so, why did it change? These are all the kinds of
questions which the metareasoning task will enable the reader to answer. Metareasoning results from keeping
explicit representations of the reasoning processes occurring during the cognitive activity. These reasoning
traces can then be reasoned about, much like any other piece of knowledge within a cognitive agent (Ram &
Cox, 1993). This functionality enables a reader to reflect on their own reasoning, thus enabling them to learn
more from the experience. For example, if the reader discovers that they were “led down the garden path” at
some point in the story, the metaanalysis will enable the reader to learn this and therefore (potentially) avoid a
similar problem in the future.
It is also possible to view metareasoning as an ends as well as a means as in the previous examples. For
example, the enjoyment in reading most mystery novels is not derived from the conclusion; otherwise, the author
could simply inform the reader upfront as to “who-done-it.” Rather, the enjoyment comes from the twists and
turns that the reader is forced to endure during the process. The final discovery of the true criminal results in
a sense of supreme satisfaction, as one can look back over their reasoning patterns and see exactly how the
conclusion was achieved.
8 A Functional Theory of Creative Reading
4 Creative understanding
It could be argued that no system can accurately implement all the aspects of our large theory and that the only
way to build reasonable systems is by restricting the coverage. We believe, however, that there are better ways
of restricting the problem than by arbitrarily focusing on a subset of reading tasks, as many earlier systems did.
Many interesting issues can be explored by concentrating on a particular genre of stories and then developing
a computational model of the complete task decomposition to support the reading and understanding of these
stories. By concentrating on the portions of the theory which most directly support the creative understanding
features, we make the research problem more manageable; by maintaining an awareness and an understanding
of the entire reading process, we avoid the pitfalls of earlier systems. Our theory, while it describes how people
read in general, is primarily concerned with how people read creatively.
4.1 Working definition of creativity
People have preconceived notions of exactly what creativity is and how to judge it in other people. Generally,
most people see creativity as something unexpected which is brilliant in some unexplained way. Or, creativity
may be seen in the artistic works of an artist; a result which possesses some sort of beauty or relevance never
existing before. Unfortunately for AI research, these feelings and instincts concerning creativity are hard to
operationalize. A definition of creativity is needed which precisely defines its aspects. We propose the following
candidate:
Creativity : A directed, internal process (Section 4.1.1) of a cognitive agent which results in an
artifact (Section 4.1.2) which is both novel (Section 4.1.3) and useful (Section 4.1.4).
The definition is not intended to capture every nuance of what makes an act creative; it is also possible that some
of the processes which fit this definition may not be considered creative by society. Still, it serves its intended
purpose of providing a common definition of the creativity phenomenon, allowing us to examine closely exactly
what our processes need to do to fall within this definition’s boundaries.
4.1.1 Process
In order for a process to be creative, it must be both internal to the reasoner involved and it must be directed. The
internal restriction ensures that the reasoner is not simply repeating a piece of knowledge they just received from
another source. For example, if an outside person tells a reasoner her phone number, the reasoner then possesses
a bit of information which is novel to them and which is certainly useful (if the reasoner in question intends to
contact the person). No one, however, would argue that the reasoner has performed something creative. They
did not internally produce the phone number in their mind, they merely acquired it. For a result to be viewed as
creative, it must have been internally generated by the cognitive processes of the reasoner.
The other restriction, that of directedness, ensures that the agent in question did not simply randomly generate
solutions until a creative one arose. While randomness is often seen as a necessary part of creativity (Boden,
1991), it is not desirable for this randomness to be totally unconstrained. The old AI adage concerning an infinite
number of monkeys typing on an infinite number of typewriters for an infinite span of time is appropriate here:
while they will certainly generate an infinite number of creative artifacts, the process by which this generation
is accomplished is not directed. Directedness is an important aspect for determining the creativeness of a given
process.
The presented working definition treats creativity as a process. While it is true that a creative process can
only be judged by the artifacts it produces, as AI researchers we are interested in identifying the processes
responsible for this generation. It is our belief that a set of mechanisms exist which interact to produce the
phenomenon popularly referred to as “creativity”. Some of these mechanisms will exist in so-called mundane
activities while others will appear primarily (if not exclusively) in the activities identified as creative. It is
therefore important to attempt to recognize these mechanisms of potential creativity, to identify the knowledge
which each must have access to, and to see the types of interactions which are possible.
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4.1.2 Artifact
In this formalism, artifact is defined to be the result of a mental process by a reasoner. This result may be an
object, which can either be physical or mental. Alternatively, the artifact may be another process. This is the
case when a reasoner uses a mental process to develop a second process.
An artifact is described by a set of attributes which define important characteristics of the artifact. One
of these attributes is the function (or set of functions) which an artifact possesses. This may not represent
the complete functionality of the given artifact; most artifacts can potentially be used for hundreds of wide
varying functions. Instead, the function attribute represents the traditional or best-known uses of a given artifact.
The remaining attributes can be divided into primary and secondary ones. Primary attributes are those which
contribute to the explanation for why the artifact can perform the function which it has; secondary attributes
are the remaining ones. Each known function of an artifact configures the attributes into potentially different
primary and secondary sets.
4.1.3 Novel
Novel is a more difficult term to define. Idealistically, an N-artifact (novel artifact) exists whenever an artifact
exists which was previously unknown to the reasoner. But, there are degrees of this novelty. For example, if the
reasoner only knows about wooden pencils which are eight inches long and them reads about a wooden pencil
which is ten inches long, it is technically an N-artifact. However, this seems somehow less novel than if the
reasoner reads a description of a pencil which is a mechanical pencil which is eight inches long. In the first case,
the pencil is still a wooden pencil, its length has changed. This probably does not affect its ability to be a pencil.
The second case, however, represents a new type of pencil, one which may potentially be a better pencil than
the original example. Yet, both are new to the reasoner. It should be clear that a more detailed view of novelty
needs to be considered.
Novelty of an artifact is defined with respect to a particular point of view (of some reasoner or set of
reasoners) and with respect to the functionality of the artifact in question. There are three broad ways in which
an artifact (M) may be novel with respect to a given function or goal (G):
 Absolute Novelty (A-Novel): M is defined to be A-Novel iff M is unknown to the reasoner whose point
of view is being considered.
 Evolutionary Novelty (E-Novel): M is defined to be E-Novel iff M is A-Novel and M accomplishes G in
a better way than other examples of artifacts which accomplish G. This is generally the result of altering
one of the primary attributes of M.
 Revolutionary Novelty (R-Novel): M is defined to be R-Novel iff M is A-Novel and M accomplished G
in a new way than other examples of artifacts which accomplish G. This form of novelty requires more
extensive changes than to simply alter the primary attributes of M. Secondary attributes may be altered
in ways which cause them to now participate in the function of M, attributes may be added to either set,
attributes may be removed, and so on. The function of the artifact remains the same; the underlying
explanation of how it accomplishes this function is what has altered.
To illustrate these differences, consider a black longsword. Without question, a red longsword will perform
the same function as the black longsword. So, the red sword, in this scenario, would be described as A-Novel.
Within a range of possibilities, a short sword, a bastard sword, and a two-handed sword are all capable of
performing the same function as the original longsword. Therefore, these are artifacts which are E-novel.
Finally, the light saber from the Star Wars series is also capable of performing the same function as the original
longsword. In this case, the light saber is an example of R-novelty.
With regard to point of view, one can see that there are two dimensions to consider, an internal perspective
and an external perspective. If an idea or act is neither novel from the perspective of the reasoner or from the
perspective of the public, it is a totally mundane act. If the act is creative to the individual but not to society in
general, it is a self-creative act, also known as psychological-creative or P-creative (Boden, 1991). An example
10 A Functional Theory of Creative Reading
of this would a child discovering the number-theoretic relationship that the digits of a number divisible by
nine must sum to a number divisible by nine. To a child, this is a fantastic discovery; to a mathematician it
is a well-known rule. The reverse of this is when the reasoner sees an act as mundane but others view it as
creative. This may come about if the reasoner has some knowledge that the general public lacks. Finally, a
historical-creative or H-creative (Boden, 1991) act results if the reasoner finds an act creative as does the rest of
society.
In both the internal and external perspectives on novelty, it is important that the reasoner whose point of view
is being considered is aware that the artifact is indeed novel . A system, for example, that possessed no memory
of its own actions could conceivably be considered to be producing nothing except internally novel artifacts;
after all, each new one is novel from the reasoner’s perspective. In our view, this memory-less reasoner would
be incapable of producing internally novel artifacts since it would be incapable of realizing their novelty.
4.1.4 Useful
Useful is perhaps a bit easier to define for an artifact. A reasoner attempting to perform creatively will have a
certain task to accomplish and a certain goal to achieve. In order for a process to be considered creative, it must
produce a solution which fulfills the goal and accomplishes the task possessed by the reasoner. This restriction
does not say that the solution must be optimal for the process to be considered creative, just that it must be
useful. The usefulness aspect is straightforward to define in our chosen domain of reading: understanding novel
concepts within a text is intrinsically useful to a reader. For example, understanding the functioning and purpose
of the light saber is useful to the reader of the Star Wars series because the understanding helps the reader enjoy
the story more.
4.2 Functional definition of creativity
The provided definition of creativity is descriptive of the process. Given a particular process in a certain situation,
it would now be possible to judge whether that process is mundane or if it exhibits some level of creativity.
However, details concerning how this view of creativity is operationalized still need to be presented. A more
formal explanation of creativity is needed in order to understand the implementational details associated with it.
In particular, it is necessary to identify the mechanisms and knowledge which is needed to accomplish processes
which can be viewed as creative.
4.2.1 Formalization of problem solving
In the abstract, creativity can be seen as an extension to what is traditionally called problem solving by the
cognitive science community. Historically, problem solving begins with the reasoner in an initial state (or start
state). A reasoner knows of various operations that they may perform which will move them through a search
space. This search stops when the goal state is achieved. The output from the process is a solution path which
takes the reasoner from the initial state to the goal state (Newell & Simon, 1972). Later research showed that
the idea of constraints was an important one (Sacerdoti, 1974; Sussman, 1973). These are conditions which
cannot be violated in the final solution to a given problem. Finally, there are times when the reasoner may also
possess a solution to the problem in question. In this case, the role of problem solving can be to discover a better
solution than the one known. To accomplish this, the reasoner needs to possess a critique as to why the current
solution is not a viable one (Hammond, 1989). The final algorithmic formulation of the problem solving process
is shown in Figure 2.
With this formalization of problem solving in place, we can now examine the phenomenon of creativity in
more detail. Roughly, creativity can be divided into two large areas, invention and understanding. Each plays
an important role in intelligence. Although we are primarily interested in creative understanding, there is much




– Initial state (I)
– Goal state desired (G)
– Set of constraints (C) (optional)
– Current solution (S) (optional)
– Critique for why S is not a good enough solution to stop with (K) (optional)
 OUTPUT:
– Solution path (S

) which achieves G given I and does not violate C
Figure 2: Formal algorithmic description of problem solving
FUNCTION Understander
 INPUT:
1. Goal state desired (G) AND/OR
2. Current solution (S)
 OUTPUT:
1. A possible solution (S) OR
2. The goal state initially desired (G) OR
3. Critique of S as a solution to G (K)
Figure 3: Formal algorithmic description of understanding
4.2.2 Creative invention
Creative invention (also called creative design) represents the generative side of creativity (for a recent discussion
of creative design, see Kolodner & Wills, 1993). When a reasoner is faced with the task of designing a novel
artifact (as defined in Section 4.1.3), they accomplish it through creative invention. When Motorola’s engineers
developed the MicroTAC, they were engaged in creative design. Not only did the designers have to create a
portable, pocket-sized cellular phone, they had to deal with the fact that people often drop things that small.
Before the design was complete, the team had helped to push the plastics industry far enough ahead to actually
provide the material that the MicroTAC needed. As a result of this and other innovations in the phone’s design,
it was recently highlighted in an issue of BusinessWeek (1993).
4.2.3 Creative understanding
Before discussing creative understanding, it is necessary to realize that a formalism similar to the problem
solving description in Figure 2 can be applied to understanding in general. The understanding formalism is
shown in Figure 3, which presents all of the optional inputs and matching outputs. In general, understanding can
refer to one of three things. Given S, understanding should tell the reasoner what possible G’s are. If a reader
sees a robotic story character try to turn off a man and then open him up, they may understand the scenario by
reasoning that the robot had the goal of repairing the man and probably thought he was malfunctioning. This
process of reasoning “backwards” from the solution to the beginning is also called abduction. Second, given
G, understanding should tell the reasoner what possible S’s are. A reader who learns that Mankind has become
extinct and that the remaining robots are curious as to the final fate of their creators may understand this by
reasoning about upcoming story actions. Better understanding leads to better prediction. Finally, given both S
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and G, understanding should provide an explanation of why S is a good solution to G. In the specific example
of Men..., the reader must understand why the robot felt that performing field repairs on the man was a good
solution to his temperature discomfort. This aspect of understanding is sometimes referred to as explanation.
Mundane understanding is more a recognition task than anything else. If a reasoner knows explanations
relating goals and solutions, and the reasoner is then presented with both a goal and a solution to explain,
the problem is simply recognizing the configuration and retrieving the proper items from memory. Similarly,
a reasoner may know what goals and solutions are logically linked; when presented with one, it is fairly
straightforward to retrieve the corresponding other. On the other hand, creative understanding is the process by
which new concepts are understood by a reasoner. This is a more difficult task than mundane understanding in
the sense that there are no in-memory items which directly answer the understanding questions. As a result, the
reasoner must resort to creative techniques in order to attempt to understand the novel concepts.
For the task of reading, consider the fact that people are able to comprehend stories which have no basis in
fact, as anyone who has ever read a Star Trek novel can verify. People are also able to transfer concepts which
exist in a story world into real world ideas. This idea of the creative level of understanding is directly related
to the idea of an active reader. An active reader will tend to engage the text more and have more opportunities
for creative understanding. In fact, many researchers refer to active reading as creative reading (e.g., Robeck &
Wilson, 1974; Gruber & Davis, 1988). Our research has led us to believe that creative understanding is a key
component of the overall reading process and that any theory of reading must explain it satisfactorily. Thus,
creativity is an essential and integrated aspect of our complete reading theory.
5 Past approaches to creativity
While there is little research expressly concerned with creative understanding, there have been many attempts to
explain exactly how the phenomenon of creativity occurs in the human species; these researchers have generally
focused on creative invention when they discussed creativity theories. A number of theories, unfortunately, chose
to concentrate on describing the process without really explaining how it occurs. Without such an explanation,
it is difficult to develop a model of the cognitive processes which act to produce creativity. It is still beneficial,
however, to examine some of these descriptive formalizations of creativity in order to gain insight into what a
good description of the process might be.
Perhaps the best known formalization of the creative process comes from the work of Wallas (1926). Wallas
viewed creativity as being made up of four steps: preparation (the reasoner gains a rich knowledge of the
problem), incubation (the reasoner’s subconscious is working on the problem), illumination (a potential answer
is consciously revealed in a flash of inspiration), and verification (where the reasoner examines, corrects, and
refines the solution). This points out that creativity takes a great deal of knowledge and preparation and that the
unconscious plays a large role in the process. Beyond that, it does not reveal much regarding how the process
would be carried out or exactly what makes up each step. As a result, it provides a good description of the
creative act but does not help us to understand it to the point where it may be modeled.
Weisberg (1986) produced an in-depth criticism of Wallas’ work on creativity. His description of the process
does not rely on the near-mystical aspect of illumination found in earlier approaches; instead, creativity is an
extension of normal problem solving.
 Creativity is an extension of problem solving using the same processes in more flexible ways.
 There is no single “creativity” module in reasoning; instead, creativity arises from a complex and inter-
connected set of processes, including problem solving, recall, adaptation, and so on.
 People do not either possess creativity or not possess it; rather, creativity exists everywhere in an incre-
mental continuum from the mundane to the more and more creative.
While more open-ended than the Wallas account, Weisberg still shys away from attempting any more defined
model of the process. Implementational details are, as textbooks often say, left to the reader.
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One place to look for explanations of how to perform creatively is in works dedicated to improving the
reader’s own creative abilities. While these are not generally intended to be valid psychological models
of creative processes, they can give insight into what sorts of processes need to be considered. Two such
techniques designed for improving people’s creative abilities are attribute listing and morphological synthesis.
Attribute listing, Crawford’s work (cited in Finke et al., 1992), begins with a reasoner considering an object
which they think can be the springboard to a new, creative artifact. Each of the object’s primary attributes are
examined, with the reasoner thinking about ways in which each could be manipulated. Finally, the reasoner
filters out the manipulations which lead nowhere; those that remain are considered to be creative.
Morphological synthesis, Allen’s technique (cited in Finke et al., 1992), begins in the same fashion as
attribute listing. The reasoner considers both attributes and commonly accepted values for each. Then, new
combinations of attributes and values are examined. The reasoner looks for unknown combinations which may
prove to be creative. While this is similar to attribute listing, in morphological synthesis, the reasoner does not
concentrate on changing attributes one-at-a-time; instead, interesting combinations are concentrated on. This
leads to faster generation of potentially creative artifacts.
Consider a piece of luggage, an everyday mundane sort of object. To perform attribute listing on it, a reasoner
would list all the primary attributes of the object and their prototypical values; in essence, the reasoner would
bring to mind an “average” piece of luggage. It is made of leather, about two foot by two foot in size, has a soft
body construction, one large compartment for storage, and is carried by means of a handle. After these major
attributes are listed, the reasoner starts to consider altering them, one at a time. Some possible changes are: cloth
may be substituted for leather, the dimensions may become larger or smaller, the the number of compartments
may change, or wheels may be used instead of a handle. The reasoner may have to “clean up” the new product
in some situations; for example, if the number of compartments become two, the reasoner must decide how the
two compartments will be integrated. Morphological synthesis would go about the process in much the same
manner, with interesting combinations of attributes considered rather than single ones. The idea is the same
as in attribute listing, the focus is just a little larger. So, the reasoner may decide to consider a large piece of
luggage with lots of compartments versus a small piece of luggage with only one. As more attributes are added
to the set under consideration, the number of possibilities grow.
The obvious drawback to these approaches is that a reasoner will never develop an R-novel object, just
relatively close variations of the original concept. As discussed in earlier, this is due to the limitation of only
considering primary attributes. As a result, E-novel artifacts are the only ones which can be created. The main
advantage of morphological synthesis is the capability of attribute combinations; this decreases the time needed
to produce potentially creative artifacts.
Notice, for instance, that neither of the two allow the introduction of new attributes. Yet, one could imagine
a number of additions to a piece of luggage which would be useful. Many travelers, for example, forget to bring
an alarm clock with them. One could conceivably add a small alarm/radio to a piece of luggage; since it is
unlikely that a traveler would forget their luggage, an alarm clock would always be “remembered.” Or, a mirror
could be added to the inside of one of the compartments. Another possible addition is the idea of dedicated
compartments of the suitcase being used for specific items.
6 Computational model of creative understanding
Creative understanding, as we have defined it, has a well-defined input and output. The research problem to
be addressed is to identify the set of mechanisms which accomplish the function as a whole. Thus, creative
understanding will be broken down in the same manner that the entire reading task was in Section 3—a functional
decomposition. In order to achieve this, both the relevant processes and the required knowledge needs to be
identified. Prior to the discussion of the mechanisms and knowledge required for creative understanding, there
are certain requirements for creativity, in general, which need to be explained.
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6.1 The willing suspension of disbelief
The first requirement for creative understanding is a willingness by the reader to suspend their skepticism of
the material being presented. This willing suspension of disbelief (first described by Samuel Taylor Coleridge
as reported in Corrigan, 1979) occurs in practically all reading, although it is more prevalent in more fanciful
texts. Consider the ambiguous title of a Larry Niven story, Flight of the Horse (1973). This phrase could refer
to a horse on an airplane flight, to a fleeing horse, or to a flying horse. If a story understanding system relied on
a belief in the validity of world knowledge (as most previous reading systems did), it would disambiguate the
phrase to rule out the latter meaning since it “knows” horses cannot fly. This is wrong if the story was about a
flying horse, which is perfectly reasonable in a science fiction story.1 The more familiar a reasoner is with the
concepts of a story (or similar concepts), the less suspension of disbelief will be required. This is one reason
why a reader finds it easier to read texts in genres in which they are most familiar; they are already familiar with
a large number of concepts which makes new concept understanding easier than it would be for a novice in that
genre.
6.2 Relation of invention to understanding
Although we are interested primarily in creative understanding, there is an interesting approach to it which
depends on creative invention. One way for a reasoner to creatively understand a concept is to discover how
they would have creatively invented the concept in question, a sort of reverse engineering of the creative act.
The reasoner begins with the novel concept and manipulates it until it resembles a concept they are more familiar
with. This leaves them with a solution path which, if reversed, would creatively invent the concept it started
with. It is not necessary that the concept being understood was actually created in the way that the reasoner
comes up with. An example of this is the unicorn (example results from a dialogue with Anthony Francis
(1993)). The modern view of the unicorn is a white, horse-like creature with a single horn. Various attributes
are given to the beast, including nobility and purity. A reasoner who is ignorant of unicorns may attempt to
understand a reference to one by appealing to their knowledge of existing creatures, beginning with the closest
analogue, the horse. Knowing that horses are capable of defending themselves through the use of hooves and
teeth, the reasoner may then combine the horse with an animal possessing a horn (or horns) used for defense.
The general shape of the unicorn is now in place. The reasoner may further make use of their knowledge of what
the color white generally symbolizes to make the inference that unicorns are pure and good. This is reinforced
by the reasoner’s impressions of horses as generally “good” creatures.2
This is a perfectly acceptable way of creatively understanding the concept of unicorn by imagining what it
would take to creatively invent such a creature. However, this is not the way in which the concept of unicorns
was initially conceived. The unicorn was a mythological animal and was initially seen as the blending of several
existing animals. It had the body of a horse, the tail of a boar, the feet of an elephant, the head of a deer, and a
two cubit long black horn in the middle of its forehead (Bulfinch, 1959). The description was developed over
a period of time through the oral tradition of the Greeks. It was based on glimpses of animals, a willingness
to believe in the supernatural, and the conceptual changes which occurred as one traveler relayed his story to
another, who told another, and so on (much like the children’s game of Telephone or Gossip). Over time, the
1Purists may object to a definition of science fiction which allows pegasi to be included; many would prefer a stronger division between
science fiction and what might be more traditionally called fantasy. Science fiction generally takes the current world, focuses on one aspect,
and then projects a “what-if” scenario considering the world if that one aspect was changed in some significant way. Fantasy generally
creates an entirely new world, usually with only a minor relationship to the current world. Fantasy, rather than utilizing technology, generally
makes use of magic. We have are currently choosing to focus on those stories which resemble the current world with some changes. As
a result, the majority of our focus will fall in the realm of science fiction, although that is not necessary. A story involving a pegasus, for
example, is not any intrinsically harder to understand than a story involving an alien creature. As far as the magic aspect goes, this is also
a non-issue; as Arthur C. Clarke noted, any sufficiently advanced science is indistinguishable from magic (1962). Our working definition
of science fiction for the current stage of the project are those stories which stretch the “real” world in some significant way while still
maintaining a good deal of similarity with it. As a result, this will include a great deal of science fiction and fantasy both.
2As a counterpoint, a reasoner presented with the unicorn-like creatures in Bailey’s science fiction novel, Brothers of the Dragon (1993),
would be lead to a very different concept of unicorn. These unicorns are not the merging of a horse with some horned animal, but rather
the merging of a lizard-like or snake-like creature with a horned animal. They are armored with edged-scales and jet-black in color. Thus,
rather than theorizing that these unicorns are noble and good, the reasoner would be more likely to see them as evil and base.
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description focused more and more on the horselike qualities and the other definition faded. Also over time, the
concepts of purity and nobility were added. Bullfinch (1959) notes that this was probably an attempt to explain
how the beast might be captured; since it embodied purity, an innocent could conceivably lure the creature into
a trap. A reasoner does not need to understand the historical development of the unicorn mythos in order to
understand a unicorn; they do need creativity.
6.3 Uses of a creatively understood story
After a story has been creatively comprehended, there are two ways it can directly aid the creative process. First,
it can act as a source of ideas. For example, reading about a certain device may prompt the reader to develop a
similar one in the real world. While the mind of the actual design team is unknown to the authors, the Motorola
MicroTAC cellular telephone bears an uncanny resemblance to the communicators used on the original Star Trek
series. The lapel-style communicators seen on Star Trek: The Next Generation strongly resemble the concept
of SmartBadges as proposed and implemented at the XeroxPARC site (Weiser, 1991). While these similarities
may be simple coincidence, the June 7 issue of BusinessWeek points to a stronger real-world example of this
phenomenon. The designer of Hewlett-Packard’s new portable DeskJet (an inkjet printer) attributes a major
design inspiration to Gort, the robot servant in the 1951 classic science fiction movie, The Day the Earth Stood
Still (BusinessWeek, 1993). Current research in this paradigm includes the work of Goodman, Waterman, and
Alterman (1991). Their SPATR system can reason about the use of novel and potentially confusing devices
(such as the AirPhone) by appealing to its existing information regarding the use and functioning of known
devices (such as a payphone or an automatic teller machine). The other way in which reading assists creativity is
similar to Carbonell’s derivational analogy (Carbonell, 1990). If a reader observes a character problem solving
creatively, they may be able to replay the solution process on a real problem in order to develop a creative
solution.
6.4 The “creative” in creative understanding
We can now turn to the issue of exactly how creative understanding is to take place. Descriptively, creativity in
general and creative understanding in particular are bound by the following constraints:
 Creativity arises out of the same sorts of processes as does mundane reasoning.
 It is possible to identify some processes as being more open to creativity.
 People who exhibit creativity generally have a great deal of knowledge about the domain in question.
 Creativity requires a willingness to take a cognitive risk, to suspend disbelief while exploring new concepts.
 Creativity cannot be objectively evaluated; the situation often determines whether or not something is
tagged as creative.
For the explanatory side of our creative understanding theory, we are working under the hypothesis that
it is possible to identify a core set of cognitive mechanisms which contribute the most to creative processes.
We begin with our algorithmic description of the understanding process, introduced in Section 4.2.3. Since the
reasoner is dealing with new concepts not in their memory, there are three basic ways which they may attempt
to understand them. First, analogy may be employed. It may be the case that a new concept is sufficiently like
a known concept that a process of analogical reasoning can be employed. The reasoner’s understanding of the
known concept is used to understand the new concept. The second approach is to reason from general knowledge
which the reasoner possesses. This is the application of abstract knowledge to the problem of understanding the
new concept. Lastly, the reasoner may attempt to creatively reverse engineer the new concept to something they
are familiar with.
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– Goal state desired (G)
– Constraint set (K)
 PROCESS:
– REPEAT
1. Attempt to perform normal memory retrieval (6.5.1)
2. If an item is returned by (1) and it is not an exact match 	 attempt analogy (6.5.2)
3. If (2) fails 	 attempt baseless analogy (6.5.3)
4. If (3) fails 	 reformulate the problem (6.5.4)
– UNTIL (successful OR iterations exceed a threshold)
Figure 4: The Creative Understanding Process
6.5 The creative understanding process
The three basic ways to achieve creative reasoning can be combined into one algorithm, the creative understand-
ing process (CUP). The cycle of creative understanding is shown in Figure 4 (while the description indicates
S as an input and G as the desired output, the same approach is used for the other examples of understanding
discussed previously). Mundane understanding exists if the reasoner only considers steps 1 and 2; that is, if the
reasoner only attempts memory retrieval and analogy. Each cycle through the complete function, on the other
hand, increases the potential for creative understanding. At some point the reasoner will be so far removed
from the original concept attempted to be explained, that further iterations will be useless. As will be discussed
in Section 7, there is a point (dependent on the context and background knowledge of the reasoner) where
creativity degenerates into bizarreness. Still, there is no theoretical limit to the “amount” of creativity which
may be generated; it is potentially unbounded. As discussed earlier, the reasoner makes a decision to suspend
disbelief of potentially creative concepts in order to explore the possibilities they represent.
6.5.1 Imaginative memory
The first step of the CUP algorithm involves a memory retrieval attempt. This is intended to be a more-or-less
normal retrieval from memory, although it can contain elements of imaginative memory response. Imaginative
memory was a term used by Turner (1992) to describe the creative mechanism within his MINSTREL system.
This technique places the responsibility of the alterations to known objects in the control of the memory system.
Suppose a reasoner is attempting to remember a scenario in their past dealing with knights killing dragons. Their
memory contains no such scenarios, but they are reminded of a time when a knight killed a troll, a time when a
king killed a dragon, and a time when a knight wounded a dragon and then negotiated with it. These are all three
variations of the original specification (dragon becomes troll, knight becomes king, and kill becomes wound).
Turner’s system makes incremental changes to the initial specification in an attempt to retrieve useful cases from
memory.
However, Turner’s scheme has two drawbacks. First, it partially relies on a careful placement of concepts
into a semantic network memory in order for proper similarity to be noticed. For example, knight and troll
are both grouped under violent characters so the above scenario could have become A troll killed a dragon.
Instead of this hand-tailoring of the knowledge in memory, we propose a general semantic memory organization,
but allow function tagging of concepts. This addition allows the semantic memory to appear to dynamically
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reconfigure itself based on functionality. Thus, a knight and a king are “closer” in memory if the reasoner is
attempting to retrieve a nobleman. On the other hand, if the reasoner is thinking about the knight as a fighting
agent, then knight and troll would be “close” in memory. The second shortcoming of Turner’s model of creativity
comes from the same place as its power. He makes use of a set of 24 heuristics which guide the creativity
process, such as change the agent involved to one of similar nature. The incremental changes give a great deal
of power to the system, but Turner never satisfactorily explains where the heuristics come from or why he settled
on the number that he did.
We use the term imaginative memory in a slightly looser way than in Turner’s work. A reasoner can request
a memory retrieval based on a set of index cues. If all the cues match some item in memory, an exact retrieval
is possible. However, the memory system should also return near matches. Some of these near matches will
be fairly mundane variations of the exact concept being probed for; others will be more imaginative. It is
important to realize that the reasoner has no control over this phase of the CUP algorithm; the memory system
is acting at a level too low for the reasoner to be aware of. In functional terms, this simply means that the
metacontrol supertask does not have access to that aspect of the memory supertask’s operation. In Turner’s
research, the distinction between what a reasoner has control over and what they did not was never clearly defined
or explained. Finally, Turner’s approach uses an iterative process which continually makes small changes to the
retrieval request; this gradually increases the range of possible retrievals. The memory supertask in our theory
has been somewhat restricted in this area; the supertask cannot perform as many iterations during a memory
retrieval. This is due to the fact that imaginative memory is only the first step in the entire CUP algorithm; as a
result, our view of the technique is inherently more limited than Turner’s. The power that the technique loses at
this stage is made up by the later steps of the CUP algorithm.
6.5.2 Analogy
The second step of the CUP algorithm involves what to do with the items retrieved from memory. If the retrieved
concept is not an exact match, this is the signal that normal understanding has failed. The memory system had
some matching criteria that determined that the retrieved concept is a potentially good candidate with which
to understand the new concept. The reasoner must now attempt to determine why this is the case. To do
this, analogy is used. Analogy is the process by which two concepts are seen to be related in some way (e.g.,
Falkenhainer, 1987; Gentner, 1989). A well-known analogy is that of the atomic structure being analogous to
the Solar System. In analogy terms, the object which a reasoner is attempting to explain is called the target and
the known analogue is the base; the reasoner discovers the relationships which exist between base and target. In
the atom example, the atom is the target and the solar system is the base. This framework can be the springboard
on which creative ideas are based. If a reasoner can find and make use of an appropriate analogue, then the
resulting behavior and/or product will at least appear to be externally creative.
6.5.3 Baseless analogy
Step three of CUP concerns what the reasoner does if straightforward analogy fails to glean an understanding
of the considered concept. If this is the case, baseless analogy is employed. Humans are more flexible than the
above description would lead one to believe. In fact, humans seem to be able to perform a type of analogy in
which there is no base. Baseless analogy occurs when the reasoner dynamically builds a base in an attempt to
understand a concept. The target in question exists within a specific domain; if the reasoner possesses a great
deal of knowledge about some other domain and a shallow amount of knowledge about the target, it might be
possible to shift the target from its original domain into the well-known one. Doing this, the reasoner creates a
base by relying on their knowledge of the new domain. This form of analogy can most easily be seen when a
concept is being explained to someone. The teacher may explain the concept by appealing to the background
information possessed by the student. For example, atomic structure can be explained within the framework of
gang warfare.3 Baseless analogy relies on the reasoner possessing a great deal of background knowledge about
3There was once a large area of the City which was a desolate wasteland of condemned buildings, known simply as the Neighborhood.
The New Boys, a street gang, currently control the Neighborhood and have their headquarters in the exact center of the wasteland. Lately,
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the domain onto which an analogy is being attempted.
6.5.4 Problem reformulation
Finally, if all of the above steps have failed to produce a satisfactory level of understanding, the reasoner
must resort to problem reformulation. There are some cases in which the initial statement of a problem or task
description is not the one which will lead to an optimal solution. By recasting the problem in a new way, a reasoner
may gain a previously unseen insight into the resolution of the situation. Recent work on this topic has been
done by Jones (1992). His thesis is that the reformulation should be from an actual problem to a more abstract
description; in particular, a primary source of culturally shared abstract knowledge exists in the form of proverbs
which reasoners can make use of in solving novel problems. We view problem reformulation as generally being
the transformation of one instantiation of a problem into another one, rather than the transformation of a problem
into a more abstract form.
Problem reformulation is also the process by which creative reverse engineering occurs in the CUP algorithm.
By successively reformulating the given problem description, it is possible to reverse engineer a chain of
creative reasoning which would lead from a mundane object to the creative artifact in question. Consider a
reader attempting to understand a unicorn who was totally unfamiliar with the concept. If the problem becomes
understand an animal which is like a unicorn but has no horn (the removal of an attribute), the next cycle
through CUP will retrieve the concept of horse from memory. The reasoner has reverse engineered unicorn to




6.6 Function-driven morphological synthesis
For creative understanding to occur, four processes must successfully interact. As described above, these are
memory retrieval (possibly imaginative), analogy, baseless analogy, and problem reformulation. We must now
specify mechanisms for these processes. Imaginative memory and problem reformulation are performed by a
common mechanism within our theory. To see how this is accomplished, we begin by considering the converse
of baseless analogy, targetless analogy. Targetless analogy occurs when a reasoner begins with a known concept
and tweaks it in various ways to discover new concepts which were not previously known. Taking the concept
of a horse, for example, and adding wings would result in a pegasus. The mechanism by which this tweaking is
accomplished is through constraint manipulation. The earlier mechanisms of attribute listing and morphological
synthesis also can be described as techniques which perform constraint manipulation. The limitations of both
were mainly caused by the enforced restriction that the techniques only alter primary attributes and constraints.
In one sense, this is not a bad heuristic; altering secondary characteristics is likely to lead to only A-novel
creations. On the other hand, it does restrict the techniques to the formation of E-novel items; R-novelty is
unlikely (if not totally impossible).
In an attempt to overcome this serious shortcoming, we have developed a new mechanism, known as
function-directed morphological synthesis (FMS), depicted in Figure 5. It is assumed that the reasoner has an
artifact which needs to be understood (either a goal (G), a solution (S), or a critique (K)). The reasoner applies a
set of manipulator functions to the artifact, altering its attributes and producing new artifacts. If only the artifacts
which possess the original functionality and are novel to the reasoner are considered, creative artifacts are the
result.
a new gang calling itself the Elected Ones has shown an interest in acquiring control of the Neighborhood. Fearing the loss of control, the
New Boys decide that they need to bring in an outside gang to aid their cause. The New Boys learn that the blood enemies of the Elected
Ones are a group of men known simply as the Pros. The Elected Ones and Pros so fear each other that as long as one Pro is in the New
Boys’ territory for each Elected One there will be no violence. So, the New Boys bring in the exact number of Pros as there are Elected
Ones. Frustrated in their takeover attempts, the Elected Ones are forced to stay outside the Neighborhood and only circle it. After a while,
all three gangs decide to change their names to include “-tron” in their names. So, the Elected Ones become the Elec-trons, the Pros become
the Pro-tons, and the New Boys become the New-trons. The Elec-trons continually circle a vast area of open space. At the center is a group
of Pro-tons and New-trons. Notice that there is always the same number of Pro-tons as there are Elec-trons. (WKRP Episode 60, 1980)
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 Consider an artifact in the world, which will be designated as M. For creative understanding,
M will be either the goal (G), the solution (S), or the critique (K).
 Let  be defined as the function which returns the function of an artifact.
 Let  be the class of functions which alter an object, either by changing some attribute of that
object or by adding a new attribute to the object.
  1 through  "! are a set of  such functions.
 Thus, a set of objects #%$&'& can be created by (*),+ 1 -'-'- !. /) .
 Consider the subset, #10 defined as 2354 768# $9&'& and %:;7</=>%:;?@<BA
 Finally, consider the subset #%C defined as 2.4 768# 0 where  is unknown to the reasoner A
 The items in # C are useful (they fulfill the same role as the original object ? ) and they are
novel to the reasoner. Therefore, they are creative.
Figure 5: Function-driven Morphological Synthesis
FMS can exist in both a strong form and in a weak form. Strong-FMS performs the changes to an object by
examining other objects with the same functionality to see how they accomplish their tasks. Weak-FMS does
away with this constraint and guides the manipulation through the reasoner’s knowledge of a given attribute
and its possible values. There is still the problem with constraint manipulation in the sense of exactly what is
allowable. This issue will be touched on in Section 7.3 when we discuss our knowledge organization scheme.
Returning to our luggage example of Section 5, let ? = piece of luggage. Then, :D?@<E= act as a
closet/dresser for a traveler while away from home. The types of alterations which were discussed earlier will
still be allowed. In addition, the types of alterations which attribute listing and morphological synthesis were
incapable of performing will now be possible.
If the memory supertask uses FMS to alter a probe for a memory search, the observed behavior will be akin
to that of imaginative memory. If FMS is permitted to act on the problem description given to the understander,
then the observed behavior will be that of problem reformulation. It is this power which allows FMS to be the
driving force in the entire creative understanding process.
7 When to say when: How far to manipulate constraints
A central issue in constraint manipulation systems is how does a reasoner know exactly which manipulations
are “good” ones and which ones are potential dangerous (or just useless). Various approaches have been taken
to attempt to minimize this problem in other systems which attempted to be creative by some metric. One end
of the spectrum is to have the system do little self-monitoring; this approach can be seen in Lenat’s AM system
(Lenat, 1990). AM was a system which discovered new mathematical ideas through a process of exploration
and constraint manipulation. It was unable to do much filtering, however, as Lenat himself would sift through
the output to point out to AM what concepts were worth exploring. So, while it did create a number of useful
and perhaps creative concepts (such as prime numbers and Goldbach’s conjecture), it also created a much larger
number of worthless concepts which were filtered out by the human researcher. Towards the other end of the
spectrum, we have systems which had built-in heuristics for deciding what to manipulate and how far to carry
the alterations. Turner’s MINSTREL system is one such example; SWALE (Kass et al., 1986) is another well
known one. Both could be considered to have done some degree of creative reasoning by appealing to these
human-supplied control heuristics. While this is certainly a good approach (especially in the initial stages of
research), we would prefer to develop a technique which would allow for more flexible restraint to be exercised,
decided (at least in part) by the system itself. We begin by examining what kinds of constraint modifications
can take place within a reasoning system.
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7.1 Types of constraint modification
There are two ways in which constraint modification may occur within the framework of FMS. The reader can
relax the definitional constraints which exist on the concept. For example, a horse’s primary mode of locomotion
is legs. Relaxing this restriction, the system may decide to consider a “horse” whose primary locomotion is
wings, resulting in a pegasus. The other option is to add a new aspect to the concept under consideration. A
suitcase, for instance, would not have any information regarding a mode of location. By adding this, it would be
possible to create an independently mobile suitcase, much like the one depicted in Terry Pratchett’s The Colour
of Magic (1983).
7.2 Problems with constraint modification
The problem with undirected constraint manipulation is that the reader has no way of knowing how far to allow
the alterations to occur. In the above example, toaster could have been made the means of horse locomotion. Or
a reader might decide that love is a good method of transportation. Up to a certain limit, constraint manipulation
will result in concepts which could be called creative. After this point, the concepts are too bizarre to be
generally useful. A “bizarreness” threshold exists: we like and understand things up to a certain level of
bizarre attributes; after that, we begin to feel uncomfortable with the concept and reject it. It is possible for
the programmer to enforce bounds on the level of bizarreness allowed to occur, but this seems to restrict the
outcomes in an unreasonable fashion (what if the story actually did involve a toaster-horse?). Alternatively,
the system could simply make arbitrary relaxations. Both of these options have been argued against from a
theoretical perspective (Birnbaum, 1986). We prefer to have reasonable relaxations emerge from a solid theory
of knowledge organization and from enforcing the idea that relaxations must be directed towards an ultimate
goal.
7.3 Knowledge organization scheme
Our knowledge organization scheme resembles a standard semantic network, but knowledge is tagged through the
use of a multidimensional grid, as shown in Figure 6. One axis of the grid represents a Schankian breakdown of
knowledge: action, agent, state, and object (Schank & Abelson, 1977). The other dimension represents a more-
or-less “natural” breakdown: physical, mental, social, emotional, and temporal. For example, a TRANSfer is a
generic action. In the physical column is the PTRANS of Schank’s work, the mental column contains MTRANS,
and the social column contains ATRANS. Our extended representation also includes emotional TRANSfers, like
the giving of one’s love to another; and temporal TRANSfers, such as the act of March getting closer to us in
time.
The other difference between a standard semantic network and our knowledge organization scheme is the
function tagging of each concept in memory. Each concept within our knowledge system is tagged with the set
of common functions which it can be used to perform. If the reasoner is searching for similar concepts to a given
one, this search can be aided by the presence of these function tags. In one search through memory, a car and a
horse would be discovered to be closely similar; with a different function in mind, a horse and a zebra would be
discovered to be close in the semantic net. This tagging allows a more flexible organization of knowledge with
the semantic network than previous methods which were forced to employ a careful placement of items into the
network to ensure that the proper similarities were revealed when needed.
Coupling our knowledge organization scheme with the function-driven morphological synthesis discussed
above results in constraint relaxation and manipulation which is bounded in a reasonable fashion. Each change
on a concept from the FMS may leave the concept in the same conceptual grid cell (an intracellular shift) or it
may cause the concept to cross a cell boundary (an extracellular shift). Additionally, each FMS change costs
the system. So, a conceptual shift which consists of only two FMS steps is easier to perform than one consisting
of six FMS steps. A cell boundary crossing costs significantly. As a result, conceptual movement within the
same grid cell is the cheapest type to perform. Movement along either a row or a column is more difficult,
and movement which must go along both is the most difficult to perform. These costs act as a heuristic which
guides a reasoner in performing creative understanding. The greater the cost, the more conceptual movement has
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Figure 6: Knowledge representation grid
occurred. As a result, the higher the cost, the more likely it is that the result will be more bizarre than creative.
This knowledge organization theory allows for constraint relaxation to take place in a reasonable manner.
Within the creative understanding process described by the CUP algorithm, this cost of movement influences
how many iterations are permissible. Each successive cycle through the function creates concepts which are
more and more distant from the original one. The first few iterations will result in concepts which fall within the
same grid cell as the original concept. More cycles will create concepts which are shifted in the grid with respect
to the beginning concept. By tracking this movement, the reasoner can decide when creative understanding has
become too expensive to allow to continue, based on the goals and tasks of the reasoner.
8 Implementation
The ISAAC system is currently implemented at a level of functionality capable of reading the story Men Are
Different (Bloch, 1963). ISAAC is built in Common Lisp and uses the KR frame package (Giuse, 1990) for
basic knowledge representation. ISAAC currently uses the COMPERE parsing system (Mahesh, 1993) as a
drop-in module for its sentence processing supertask. The union of the two systems is not yet seamless, so
ISAAC’s higher-level reasoning actually processes a mixture of representations produced by the COMPERE
parser and representations produced by hand-translation of certain “difficult” sentences (the ratio of COMPERE
sentences to hand translated ones is approximately 3 to 1). At present, ISAAC is capable of building a detailed
story structure model, a scenario model of the events depicted, and a metareasoning model of its own activities
during the reading process. On the knowledge side, there are currently a few hundred concepts stored within the
system. This knowledge is organized according to our knowledge organization grid.
The story we are currently working with is the example one presented in Section 2.2, Men Are Different by
Alan Bloch (1963). ISAAC processes the understanding of this story in the following ways. ISAAC is initially
told to read the text file containing Men Are Different.4 ISAAC is expressly told that the file it is to read is a
narrative science fiction text; as a result, ISAAC’s metacontrol decides that the first thing it needs to accomplish
4Read in this case means to consult a disk file line by line in order to simulate the reading process. While we do not expressly model
eye-movement, as in Just and Carpenter (1988), ISAAC does have the capability to skip around in the file in a nonlinear fashion. This
approximates a human reader’s ability to reread sections of the text, if needed.














































Figure 7: Partial view of ISAAC’s understanding of Men Are Different
is to see if the text has an attached title and/or author. ISAAC’s generic narrative story structure model includes
the information that a set of text with a phrase and an agent prior to the beginning of the first paragraph can be
assumed to have an attached title and author. Metacontrol makes use of this, treating the stand-alone phrase Men
Are Different as the assumed title, and the supplied agent Alan Bloch as the assumed author. The author requires
no further understanding, it is simply recorded as the author of the current story and as being attached to an agent
in the same reality that ISAAC is in. The title is passed on to the other supertasks so that further processing
of it may occur. The sentence processor parses the sentence for ISAAC; since ISAAC is starting the reading
experience, it is unable to provide any hints to that supertask. The phrase is recognized as an extended state
declaration: ISAAC expects an object to be related to another object in a given way. Scenario understanding
tags Men (a type of agent which ISAAC is familiar with) as the first object and Different is as the relation in
question. Metacontrol now expects to find the second object; namely, what Men are Different from. At this
point, no such answer is available. Metacontrol decides, due to its knowledge of the importance of titles in most
texts, that this is an important omission. ISAAC expects to find the answer to this pending question in later text
pieces. Now that the title and author have been understood, various memory requests are generated. First, the
title and author are remembered (more specifically, the memory supertask is requested by metacontrol to store
the information). Next, a memory probe is requested to see if the system has either read this story before, read
other Alan Bloch works, or read other stories about men being different. Since this is the first story episode,
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nothing is returned.
ISAAC is now ready to begin reading the body of the story. The pronoun reference task is responsible
for determining that the I in the story refers to an agent whose occupation is archaeology. At this point, the
story structure model being used to guide ISAAC needs to be changed. The generic story ISAAC knows about
is a third-person narrative. The sentence processor has just found a pronoun acting in the role of an agent.
This indicates to the genre identifier that it cannot be a third-person narrative, since it is known (also from the
sentence processor) that the sentence in question is simple declarative. ISAAC does a memory retrieval and
discovers that first-person narrative more closely resembles the story thus far and switches to it. This gives
the story structure supertask the protagonist of Men Are Different for “free.” Punctuation analysis (a part of
the sentence processing supertask not covered by COMPERE) notices that Men is capitalized in a way which
does not follow grammar rules, implying that the word carries special meaning. ISAAC’s metacontrol decides
to remember this anomaly as potentially important. Meanwhile, character identification adds the fact that I is
a story character. By the end of the first paragraph, ISAAC realizes that something is not quite right. ISAAC
knows about modern-day robots which are industrial machines, capable of performing autonomously in various
highly repetitive tasks, such as spot welding on a car. The robot which is being described in the first paragraph
is very different from this. ISAAC’s metacontrol decides that it needs to attempt to creatively understand the
concept of robot it is being presented with and suspends its disbelief in such an object for the benefit of the
story. This decision is motivated by ISAAC’s inability to understand the story within the conceptual framework
initially possessed by ISAAC.
Creative understanding is now faced with the task of explaining the robot that ISAAC sees in the story. A
normal memory retrieval returned a concept of robot which is insufficient to explain the story character. Concepts
which were imaginatively retrieved from memory (factory machines, mechanical tools) are also too limited to
provide an adequate explanation. Creative understanding now attempts baseless analogy on the concept of robot.
Taking robot as an industrial tool, ISAAC attempts to transfer the concept to the domain of volitional agents
(since this is how the story robot appears to be acting). This attempt is somewhat less than totally successful;
in this case, ISAAC does not have enough background knowledge to allow the success of baseless analogy in
this case. Next, ISAAC attempts problem reformulation, using FMS to produce a merged concept containing
elements of the current robot concept and the best volitional agent it can retrieve from memory—a man. The
result is a man-like (in form), intelligent, volitional robot. Man-like is used since ISAAC has now answered the
question of what Men are Different from—robots. ISAAC’s understanding of standard narrative structures is
that authors do not waste time presenting the reader with the blatantly obvious. So, in addition to being somehow
different from robots, men must also have some similarities to robot (after all, it does not make sense to say
Men are different from three ton boulders of granite; it’s an obvious fact). As such, the new concepts maintains
the characteristics of the original robot in the sense that it is made of metal, resistant to damage, uses sensors
and feedback as a control mechanism, and so on. This concept is sufficient to understand the robot in the story.
ISAAC then store the new concept in memory as a story-robot.
The rest of the story proceeds in a similar fashion; we will touch on only a few highlights until the final two
paragraphs. The main differences to the above procedure occur in the third paragraph. The second paragraph
provides additional background, as does the fourth. The third presents the most problem, since it contains a
high degree of metaphor. Men do not have bright flames as far as ISAAC knows. At this stage in ISAAC’s
development, we are choosing to “punt” on this issue; ISAAC’s imaginative memory returns a scenario where
bright flame is used as a description of superiority. This allows straightforward understanding of the sentence.
In later versions, ISAAC will be required to attempt creative understanding on this concept as well. Divine is
a known concept and reinforces the assumptions made about bright flame. The sentence discussing the strands
of the web is left non-understood. We do not provide a direct meaning, and ISAAC is currently lacking the
necessary information to successfully understand it. The idea that the current civilization has lost something that
Mankind had is understood; the assumption is that it is not a physical object, but something more abstract. When
the story understanding is complete, ISAAC is left with an outstanding goal of understanding this concept.
The last two paragraphs act as a “story-within-a-story.” The metacontrol supertask must enable the system
to understand the ending paragraphs in this way. This story, while short, contains a complex temporal structure.
Time does not flow linearly in the story; any reader attempting to understand it, ISAAC included, must be able to
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handle this as it is these last two paragraphs which makes the point of the story. In order to appreciate the ending,
the reader must have maintained an accurate model of the narrator, including its beliefs and goals, in order to
understand why the robot’s mistake took place. ISAAC needs to perform a similar creative understanding task
on the man in the story as it did on the robot narrator. In this case, however, the need to perform the creative
understanding arises from a need to understand why the robot narrator acted in the fashion that it did. As a result,
ISAAC understands that the robot is seeing the man as more similar to itself than is warranted, this explains the
logical error.
The key irony in the story can be seen as a dual shift within our knowledge organization grid. ISAAC is
presented with a robot character which is acting as an agent rather than as a physical object. This is the first
shift which must take place for ISAAC to “make sense” of the story. The twist ending occurs because the robot
narrator decides to treat the Man, a physical agent, as a physical object and disassemble him with the intent of
doing a field repair.
During the reading experience, multiple cases are being built. A case is a memory of a specific experience
in the life of a reasoner (Kolodner, 1993). First, there is the case representing the events of the story, a summary
of what ISAAC understands of the text. Second, this case contains a subcase representing the flashback scene.
Since it stands on its own as a separate event, it is an independent case. Third, there is a case which represents
the actions of ISAAC as it read and understood the story. This case includes the information as to when the
system realized that the main character was a robot and not a man, as well as other key points in the course of the
reading experience. It is a trace of what ISAAC went through during comprehension rather than simply being
the result of the comprehension task. If ISAAC had greatly empathized with the robotic narrator (currently
beyond its abilities), a fourth case may also exist. This would be a sort of “pseudo-experience” in the history
of the system—it would remember it as being in the context of a story, but the events will seem more real than
that. Such a case in memory could, for instance, aid the ISAAC if it ever has to deal with a person from a
radically different culture and it remembers that one should not project a way of life onto another due to surface
similarities.
Finally, if ISAAC is familiar with science fiction stories or with this author, the start of this reading experience
will trigger remindings which aid the process. ISAAC is familiar with science fiction from the information we
have provided it as background. As a result, the idea of a robot narrator will not require as much disbelief
suspension as someone who had never read a science fiction story. Recall that for ISAAC to comprehend the
story, it must be willing to accept that robots are the dominant lifeform in the future, that humans have practically
died out, and that robots are capable of making the logic errors that the narrator did. Had ISAAC refused to
accept this world, the story will not be fully appreciated.
A portion of ISAAC’s understanding of this story can be seen in Figure 7. The process of reading transforms
a text from the given form to a series of representative cases and the three understanding models shown in the
figure.
9 Evaluation
The final facet of our theory which we need to consider is that of evaluation. The theory needs to be evaluated
both as a reading theory and as a creativity theory.
9.1 Reading evaluation
Traditionally, AI reading systems have been evaluated in one of two ways—either by having the system answer
researcher-supplied questions regarding the read material or by having it produce a summary of the text (this is
true of almost all AI reading research; see, e.g., Wilensky, 1981; Cullingford, 1981; Dyer, 1983; Lehnert, 1977).
In either case, the system’s output was judged by the researcher. If the question answering approach was used,
the questions tended to be of two types: literal questions whose answers were directly in the text, and inference














were generally required to capture the main points of the text in a succinct manner. Thus, the AI system was
“tested” in a way akin to that of a student being tested for reading comprehension.
With ISAAC, one must be wary of both of these methods. It has been argued that ISAAC will be impossible
to judge correctly due to the very fact that it is creative. The argument says that any answer ISAAC gives will
be judged correct as it is possible within the bounds of creativity. Consider the following short, short narrative:
John hit Mary. Mary ran into the house, crying. A minute later, Mary’s mother came out of the
house and scolded John.
If asked the question Why did John hit Mary?, ISAAC might very well respond with Because space aliens from
the Vega system controlled his mind and forced him to do it. As argued above, there is a point where creativity
breaks down and becomes simply bizarre. With no other context, the above answer is probably more bizarre
than creative.
To control this facet of ISAAC’s evaluation, we developed the comprehension grid depicted in Figure 8. The
shaded area represents the scope of previous story understanding systems. The dashed line symbolizes a rough
boundary between the creative and the bizarre. It is dashed because the exact location of this boundary will
differ from genre to genre and possibly from story to story. Each level lower on the left-hand column represents
a type of comprehension which is progressively more involved. Each such level also allows more creativity to
manifest without crossing the bizarreness threshold.
Literal comprehension is the simplest form of comprehension. It involves understanding a text sufficiently
to answer direct questions concerning it. In the John and Mary story above, a level of literal comprehension
would be adequate to answer questions such as Who hit Mary? (John) and Who ran into the house? (Mary).
Semantic inferencing refers to a level of comprehension which adds conceptual knowledge to the literal level.
It would allow the reader to handle questions such as What sex is Mary? (female) and Did John touch Mary?
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(yes). These answers are not directly in the story but can be inferred from the facts that Mary is generally a
girl’s name and that in order to hit someone, you have to touch them. The next level comprehension, reference,
involves a more sophisticated understanding of story elements. It would allow the reader to see that Mary
was crying, Mary’s mother did the scolding, and that the mother came out of the same house that Mary ran
into. Next is episodic inferencing, which allows more in-depth reasoning about story elements. This reasoning
does not result from semantic knowledge concerning story concepts, but from the reader’s own experiences
dealing with similar scenarios. An example question and answer would be Why did John hit Mary? (She was
teasing him). This response is not a result of the meaning of to hit but is plausible given an average reader’s
background knowledge. Episodic comprehension is the next comprehension level. This level represents the
reader understanding the entire story as a cohesive set of events and seeing the underlying causal patterns. At
this point in the comprehension scale, the reader would be able to supply a title for the story (in this case, perhaps
The Quarrel) and to answer more abstract questions, such as Should Mary’s mother have scolded John? and
What ages do you think the characters are?.
The above levels of comprehension represent roughly what previous story understanding systems were
capable of accomplishing. The remaining levels represent higher comprehension levels which human readers
possess. Episodic comprehension can be carried a step further to arrive at the level of incorporation. At
this level, the reader understands the story as a cohesive set of events, can see how the story relates to other
experiences in their own life, and can use the experience for reasoning about future events which are similar.
There is one final level of comprehension, historical relevance. This is the most elusive of the levels and requires
the most sophistication on the part of the reader. Some stories’ comprehension rely on the reader understanding
the historical period in which they were written. For example, Orwell’s 1984 (1949) is better understood if the
reader is aware of the sociopolitical climate of the late 1940s, in which it was written.
Reading teachers and researchers have broken comprehension down in an analogous way to our seven
levels. Teaching reading textbooks (e.g., Strang et al., 1967) describe three levels of comprehension. The literal
comprehension level is when the reader understands the literal meaning of the text. This level is represented
in our breakdown by the first five levels and makes up the largest portion of reading comprehension. The next
level, reading between the lines, is when the reader can accurately reason about the intents and purposes of the
author of the text. Characters are identified with, truth value can be assigned, various points of view may be
recognized, and the reader is capable of understanding metaphor and irony. In our seven-level comprehension
table, levels four, five, and six represent this level of understanding. Finally, there is the level of reading beyond
the lines. The reader fully incorporates the read material into their own background, learns new concepts from
it, can place it within historical relevance, and has a complete understanding of the text. Levels six and seven
of our breakdown correspond to this final level of understanding.
To be judged a success, ISAAC must be capable of answering questions and generating summaries which
fall within that region covered by previous systems. In addition, ISAAC must demonstrate some level of
comprehension beyond these earlier systems in order to be viewed as an improvement. ISAAC’s creativity
will be judged by how much of the creative portion of the grid it manages to cover without degenerating into
the bizarre zone. This coverage will be judged based on the answers to questions posed to the ISAAC system
and on the summaries it produces. Since we are using real stories, we have an opportunity to make use of real
evaluation questions, as well. Turner (1992) appealed to everyday people to judge the level of performance of
his story generation system, MINSTREL. We intend to follow a similar path of removing some of the evaluation
from the researchers’ control. To achieve that end, we plan to ask high school English teachers to read the stories
we provide and generate questions covering the material. After ISAAC has been “quizzed” on the stories, the
answer set will then be graded by the teachers and a grade assigned. While only one metric of evaluation, we
feel it will be an important one.
9.2 Creativity evaluation
If ISAAC is to be accepted as a true “creative” reader, then there must also be a way of evaluating its creative
potential. This is more difficult than reading evaluation; while educators do believe they have fairly accurate
ways of judging reading ability, no one claims to have a similar degree of success with judging creative acts.
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Internal External Concept production Concept combination Result
NO NO NO NO Mundane result
NO YES NO YES Other combinatorially creative
NO YES YES NO Other productively creative
NO YES YES YES Other creative
YES NO NO YES Self combinatorially creative
YES NO YES NO Self productively creative
YES NO YES YES Self creative
YES YES NO YES Significantly combinatorially creative
YES YES YES NO Significantly productively creative
YES YES YES YES Significantly creative
Figure 9: Views of creativity
Part of the problem, as discussed earlier, is that creativity assessment is a highly subjective thing.
It is almost certain that ISAAC will act in a way which it views as creative, in much the same fashion as a
child discovering new concepts. As with the child, it is also likely that much of what ISAAC comes up with
will be well known to the researchers involved. It is possible to extend our earlier internal/external creativity
description in an attempt to get at a better understanding of how a creative program would be judged. As
described by Leary (as reported in Taylor, 1988), it is possible to break creativity into the production of new
concepts and the combination of existing concepts. Doing so, results in four types of individuals being identified
(the following also comes from Taylor, 1988):
 reproductive blocked: This person is mundane, no new concepts are created and there are no new
combinations of existing concepts.
 reproductive creator: No new concepts are directly generated, but this individual is capable of creatively
combining existing concepts.
 creative creator: The creative pinnacle, this person creates new concepts and can successful use them in
new ways.
 creative blocked: The final category includes those individuals who are capable of producing new concepts
but is unable (or possibly unwilling) to use them in any way other than a in a known, mundane fashion.
Combining these four creativity types with our earlier discussion of internal/external creativity, we get the
table depicted in Figure 9. Notice that all of the possible sixteen combinations are not represented; some of the
possible ones have no real meaning. Figure 9 is not intended to indicate that those ten divisions are the only
ones which exist in a creativity spectrum. The creativity spectrum extends infinitely from the beginning point of
mundane to the more and more creative; the ten divisions identified in the figure represent “signposts” along this
infinite pathway. The average creative act, whether invention or understanding, will contain elements of several
of these points. The ten degrees of creativity identified in Figure 9 would map onto the vertical axis of Figure 8.
This does not mean that we (or anyone) can arbitrarily decide at what point the comprehension at a given level
crosses over from the creative to the bizarre; the scale is not the same for each level of comprehension. On the
other hand, the creativity scale, as rough as it is, does give some objective evaluation potential to the process of
judging a so-called creative episode from a reasoner.
9.3 Genre notes
Finally, a note must be presented concerning the nature of the genre of stories we have chosen for ISAAC. As
already mentioned, science fiction stories offer tremendous opportunities for creative understanding; indeed,




















(b) Still science fiction
Figure 10: Science fiction concepts
many science fiction works force the reader into a position of needing to perform creative understanding,
especially if they are a novice science fiction reader. Many of the devices described in science fiction stories
have predated actual real world artifacts of the same type. For example, the artifacts in Figure 10(a) all existed
in stories prior to existing in reality. The items in Figure 10(b) represent a handful of artifacts which currently
have no real world instantiation. It should be clear, then, that science fiction offers countless opportunities and
requirements for creative understanding to be performed.
There is also an inherent danger with short stories in general which we must guard against in our selection
process. Since the mechanism of communication is limited to a few hundred words, authors may count on the
reader’s background filling in crucial bits of information. This is perfectly acceptable unless the needed bit of
information is extremely story-specific. If this is the case, then ISAAC would seem to be too tailored to the
particular set of stories given it. We have tried to avoid this pitfall by choosing stories which, while requiring
significant amounts of creative understanding, hinge on more-or-less general knowledge (at least across the
domain of science fiction stories). Men Are Different, for example, embodies concepts of the future, space
travel, intelligent machines, the extinction of humankind, and so forth; all of these concepts may be useful in
other science fiction stories. In contrast, there is the short story Blood by Fredric Brown (1992). It involves the
time traveling of two vampires, who are fleeing into the future. They hope to find a future where knowledge of
vampires has been lost and they may feed in peace. After a few narrow escapes, they arrive in the far future to
be confronted by a telepathic race of new creatures (humans have long since died out). The creature confirms
that it knows nothing of vampires, this excites the protagonists greatly. Unfortunately, the final line of the story
has the lifeform revealing that it is actually an intelligent, evolved form of the turnip. Naturally, the saying that
You can’t get blood from a turnip must be known to fully appreciate the story; while this knowledge could be
given to ISAAC, it seems too specific to be of use in a wide variety of stories.
10 A critique of past reading research
A methodological goal of any complete theory should be the formation of a common framework in which
past theories and systems can be placed. Our functional theory allows us to judge past attempts from several
perspectives. The most important ones are:
 A critical examination of past systems in order to discover which tasks and supertasks they attempted to
cover.
 A similar examination carried out on past theories which do not exist in a system form. This includes a
critique of the processes and knowledge that each identified as important or central.
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 A critical review of systems with regards to the types of knowledge each understood.
 An examination of the creative understanding aspects of past reading systems.
10.1 A critique of past reading systems from a task perspective
Past reading systems have not been greatly successful due to their insufficient coverage of the set of tasks which
reading involves. Early examples such as PAM (Wilensky, 1981) and SAM (Cullingford, 1981) were narrow
attempts to handle scenario understanding through plans and scripts. They did not try to benefit from other
aspects of the reading process; furthermore, they dealt with extremely short narratives. Dyer’s BORIS (1983)
was a more involved system which attempted to overcome the deficiencies of earlier ones by integrating the
current theories of its day in order to perform “in-depth” reading. Unfortunately, it too overlooked some crucial
aspects of the reading process which we have identified, such as the story structure. BORIS also ignored the
human facility to skim and skip portions of a text and attempted to read everything in as much depth as possible.
This meant that a huge amount of internal representation was required before reading could take place, placing
a limit on the number of stories which could be read. Later systems tried to vary the reading depth, such as
IPP (Lebowitz, 1983) and AQUA (Ram, 1991). Unfortunately, IPP failed to do any high-level reasoning, such
as explanation of anomalies. AQUA added the explanation and reasoning supertask, as well as some of the
memory supertask, but it ignored the story structure aspects which could have been a valuable aid.
There were other systems being developed which carried scenario understanding to a more refined level by
augmenting it with the explanation and reasoning supertask we have identified. These attempts placed a greater
emphasis on plan recognition than some other systems (such as PAM) had. Levy (1979), for example, believes
that this identification of characters goals, beliefs, and plans is the crucial aspect of reading which needs to be
studied. Grosz and Sidner (1986) share this assumption; they see reading comprehension as consisting of three
parts: linguistic, intentional, and attentional. The linguistic portion handles sentence processing, the intentional
manages the goals, plans, and beliefs of the participants in the text, and the attentional handles the way in which
the reader relates to the text. This model is similar to our theory but does not make use of an explicit story
structure understander, an explicit memory management supertask, or an explicit explanation supertask. As
such, it covered more of the reading process than other attempts, but did not attain complete coverage of the
tasks which we have identified.
There were other attempts to use the idea of plan recognition as the basis for a reading comprehension system
as well. The idea of a text communicating the intentions and plans of the characters involved can be traced back
to the philosophical work of Grice (1957). His thesis was that to understand language (or text) completely, one
must not only understand what the words mean but what the beliefs and intentions of the speaker (or characters)
are. Prior to the work which attempted to make tenable systems based on this, there was a great deal of research
in AI dealing with planning (for early, foundational work in this area, see Newell & Simon, 1972; Sacerdoti,
1977; Fikes & Nilsson, 1971). By making use of this, some systems attempted to directly understand text by
identifying the plans of the characters. Allen (1979; 1983) and Wilensky (1981) were among the first to attempt
this. Others included Carberry (1988) and Sidner (1985). Plan recognition is a powerful technique, particularly
when the reader is able to understand the interactions of characters and their plans, rather than understanding
a single character (Wilensky, 1983). Still, it is too limiting to be a complete model of reading; a system
concentrating on just plan recognition falls into the same trap as all the systems described—concentrating on
too small an area of the reading process.
Other systems also concentrated on various narrow aspects of the total problem. CYRUS (Kolodner, 1984)
concerned itself with the memory management issues, but slacked in the other aspects of reading. Not all story
understanding systems overlooked the story structure or the sentence level as an aid. For example, story grammar
theory (Rumelhart, 1977) explains stories much like our story structure supertask does—they are coherent text
passages with characters, a setting, and a series of actions (the plot description). Unfortunately, story grammars
do not go beyond this level; they ignore scenario understanding, sentence processing, and reasoning. There
have also been numerous systems which concentrate solely on the sentence processing level. These include
ATNs, statistical analysis, and more sophisticated parsing methods. Some had a great deal of success; however,
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there are many sentence problems which can be more easily solved through the use of higher level processes
(Birnbaum, 1986). The sentence processing supertask must be interwoven with the entire system. Without
doing this, it is difficult to move much beyond sentence level comprehension.
While they made significant contributions to the areas they focused on, these past systems all ignored aspects
of the total reading process. Because of this, they had to work harder at the portions they did consider. Our claim
is that the set of reading tasks we have outlined reinforce each other, aiding one another during comprehension.
A complete understanding of the tasks and their interaction will enable better reading systems to be developed.
Our theory has tried to address past systems’ deficiencies by making use of what was learned from each attempt.
10.2 A critique of past theories of reading
The systems described above were all the result of artificial intelligence research with various degrees of influence
from psychology. However, the product of AI research is not the system itself, it is the theory behind it. In
some way, then, the critiques above were of theories rather than of systems. We concentrated on the systems
for the reason that some of the described work was not intended to be an actual reading theory/system; instead,
the work used reading as a task to demonstrate the research results. There does, however, exist a long history
of research on the question of what reading is, from both the psychology and teaching reading discipline; the
line can be traced back to the publication of Huey’s influential text, The Psychology and Pedagogy of Reading
(1908). Since that time, numerous theories of what reading is and how it is accomplished have been proposed.
A close examination of these theories reveals that a wide amount of variation exists among them, with several
levels of description being concentrated on.
Graesser (1981) described six basic knowledge sources involved with textual comprehension: linguistic,
rhetorical, causal, intentional, spatial, and roles, personalities, and objects. Mackworth (1972), on the other hand,
took another approach and chose to concentrate on the processing which goes into reading, developing a model
of the reading task which was largely an information processing one. Other well-known reading researchers
also concentrated more on the process than on the knowledge needed. One of the most detailed models was
developed by Gough (1972) who came up with a model of “one second of reading,” which was designed to
describe all of the processes making up one second of oral reading.
Another level of description which researchers considered was that of the skills needed for proper reading
comprehension. Davis (1968) identified five skills necessary for reading to occur. These were: memory for
word meanings; drawing inferences from the content; following the passage’s structure; understanding and/or
recognizing the author’s purpose, attitude, tone, and mood; and being able to answer questions, either explicitly
or in paraphrase. Notice that these skills are sort of an intermediate level between knowledge and process and
include elements from both. A similar model was suggested by Clymer (1968) which broke reading into decoding,
grasping the author’s meaning, testing and recombining the author’s messages, and application/extension of the
read material. A very extensive view of the make-up of reading was the Barrett Taxonomy, Cognitive and
Affective Dimensions of Reading Comprehension, also reported in Clymer (1968). A notable addition to past
taxonomies was the category of appreciation which involved emotional response to the text.
The final two models which we wish to touch on are possibly the most influential to date. The first is the
result of extensive research by Kintsch and van Dijk (1978). Their model proposes a unified process which
is responsible for all of the characteristics of reading described in the above attempts. Text is transformed
into propositions (units of information) which are combined by the reader into higher level understanding
structures. The model has been extremely successful in modeling psychological data regarding the reading
process, particularly those research dealing with recall of read material. The model has also been updated and
expanded by a number of researchers, including the original creators (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Still, most of
the extensions to the original work generally expand the theory at the low-level. The two most significant high-
level concepts which are still not handled are creative reading and treatment of the author’s intent. It has been
shown that creativity is linked to reading comprehension (Popov, 1993) and this has always been our contention.
No other existing theory of reading has attempted to handle this aspect of reading, even though education has
long recognized its significance. While the van Dijk and Kintsch theory may be valid for explaining structured
reading tasks, it is unable to handle pleasure reading. Author intent is also rarely handled. Authors intend for
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text to be understood (for a recent discussion of this issue, see Gerrig, 1993). Therefore, there is a large amount
of redundant information contained in text. The need to skim and skip portions of the text is imperative, but
many other theories fail to allow for this. The coverage of reading theories we have handled is rather broad; we
feel that many psychological theories and particularly artificial intelligence theories overlook the work done on
reading in the field of education.
The second current influential model is the result of research done by Carpenter and Just (1988). They
chose to concentrate on the working memory constraints of the reader and how these influence reading and
recall issues. They, too, have had a great deal of success modeling human subjects’ performance within their
READER framework. The Carpenter and Just approach, however, also ignores issues of creative reading and
author intent, as so many theories do. The primary focus of their work has always been on memory’s influence
on the reading process; in that regard, their work has had tremendous success and impact on future work. So,
while the theory is capable of explaining much of what it set out to accomplish, it is insufficient for modeling
the type of reading in which we are most interested.
The above whirlwind look at reading theories should have left the reader with a sense of discomfort. Each
theory seems to miss something; curiously, what one theory is lacking seems to be taken up by another one.
This is an important aspect of the past research to consider. Many of the theories above concentrate on the what
of reading: what skills a reader needs and what types of comprehension exist. In contrast, the Kintsch and van
Dijk model and the Just and Carpenter model both concentrate more on the how of reading. This dichotomy is
partially the result of some of the theories being more heavily based in the education field, while others come
from a background in psychology or cognitive science. While none of theories described were “wrong,” none
of them were complete enough. For one reason or another, the researchers chose to concentrate on a slice of
the entire spectrum of what reading is. Some were concerned with what it is, some with how to teach it, some
with why people read, and others with how the act is accomplished. A junior high school literature textbook
(Beck et al., 1991) concisely sums up the above views. At the start of the text, the authors attempt to explain to
the reader both how and why people read. They point out that “for many readers, the answer to that question
[why people read] is, ‘To meet new people. To have new experiences. To get information.’.” This is a good
summation of the why. The authors also attempt to touch on the how. They believe that if a reader is actively
engaging the text, then they must be asking self-generated questions as they read the material, making predictions
concerning what is going to happen next, and relating the text to their own experiences and life. Finally, when
reading is finished, the active reader will attempt to put everything together, consider the hanging questions (if
any), ponder on deeper meanings of the text, decide on a main idea, and so on. Our research attempts to explain
how this is all accomplished.
10.3 A critique of past systems from the knowledge perspective
The knowledge grid representation can also be used to critically examine past systems. For example, Domeshek’s
ABBY system (1992) concentrated primarily on the social column of the grid. SAM and PAM (and most other
early systems) were primarily interested in the physical and mental columns (with some items from the social
added). CYRUS attempted to cover all aspects of the grid to at least a shallow level of understanding. Other
attempts have tried to capture the essence of temporal relationships. This includes work in real temporal
reasoning (see, for example, Scerba, 1979); for example, if you are told on Monday that something is due “next
week,” when is it really due? Before the Friday four days away? Within seven days? Within eleven days
(the second Friday)? Social conventions and background influence this type of reasoning the most. Temporal
research also included attempts to capture temporal metaphors, such as “March is rapidly approaching” (Lakoff
& Johnson, 1980). Finally, there have been attempts to capture the information which would reside in the
emotion column of our knowledge grid (e.g., O’Rorke & Ortony, 1992). The knowledge representation grid
used in our theory synthesizes and extends these earlier attempts.
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10.4 A critique of past systems from the creative understanding perspective
It is also possible to use the creative understanding perspective to evaluate past systems. While most systems
restricted themselves to strict reliance on world knowledge, there were some exceptions. AQUA built expla-
nations of scenarios which it did not possess knowledge of, such as terrorist suicide bombings. Meta-AQUA
(Ram & Cox, 1993) attempts to modify its world knowledge in pursuit of the interpretation which holds more
of the story coherently together. Looking over past systems, one can see that the ones which performed some
level of creative understanding were presented as learning systems, for the most part. A person, it would seem,
only learns when knowledge that they possess is challenged in some way by new material and an integration of
the new material takes place.
11 Future work
On the side of implementation, current plans call for ISAAC to be extended and enhanced in a number of ways
in the near future. First, the system will be expanded and refined to the point where a more detailed scenario
understanding and more refined metacontrol are in place. These extensions will allow ISAAC to understand
straightforward stories and will permit us to concentrate on the creative understanding aspects of our theory. The
COMPERE–ISAAC connection will also be expanded to the point where COMPERE is fully integrated into the
sentence processing supertask and all of the story is handled by COMPERE, with COMPERE receiving feedback
from ISAAC concerning what it needs to perform next. Evaluation will begin on the system, as outlined above.
We will also begin to extend ISAAC to work with additional stories, gradually building up the set of texts which
it is capable of handling; for example, over the next few weeks, a second story will be brought into the realm of
what ISAAC can read. Finally, on a more engineering note, ISAAC will be made easier to use and to understand
through the addition of a graphical interface.
Within the framework of extending ISAAC as a reading system, we will also be extending its creative
abilities. To increase the level of creativity, we will primarily be concentrating on the memory and explanation
supertasks. The CUP algorithm will be fully implemented and tested in order to gain an understanding of where
its power lies. A variety of tests will be performed with the creativity mechanisms at various levels performance.
This will allow us to understand exactly what creativity gives ISAAC that was lacking in earlier systems.
Further work is also needed to refine both the reading theory in general and the creativity theory in particular.
The increased level of implementation will allow this refinement to occur as we will be able to judge the success
of ISAAC on more than a single story. It is also our intent to gather psychological data on aspects of the reading
process and the creative understanding process which our theory predicts. This improvement in our theory, of
course, will be channelled back into improved and more accurate implementation.
With the implementation increased to the above levels, we will be able to judge the validity of some of our
theoretical claims. Various experimental tests will be performed on the system in order to gauge its abilities.
Ablation studies (Cohen & Howe, 1988) will be done to pinpoint the impact each form of knowledge and each
supertask has on the overall task of reading. These results will be compared to psychological data concerning
the reading process. Finally, as mentioned earlier, another way which the ISAAC system will be judged is
through the testing by high-school English teachers. Taken together, the metrics we have discussed will allow
us to accurately and objectively judge ISAAC, as well as the theory of creative reading which drives it.
12 Conclusions
Reading is one of the most complex cognitive abilities we humans possess. Past research has generally
concentrated on only a small portion of the entire process; this has led to a shallow understanding of the tasks
involved. Our theory reflects this inherent complexity but better describes the comprehension process. By
making heavy use of the total knowledge which exists within a story and by relying on an intensive interaction
between the various reading tasks, our theory is capable of modeling the reading process. In addition to
describing the reading task, we are also able to explain the inadequacies of previous systems.
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The theory incorporates a general process of creative understanding as an integral part of reading. Creative
understanding is modelled as an extension of mundane understanding. The power of the act comes from a
willingness to not be bound by current world knowledge, to take a cognitive risk and attempt to understand
something in a way it has never been understood before. This is accomplished through the techniques of
imaginative memory, analogy, baseless analogy and problem reformulation. Function-driven morphological
synthesis is the underlying mechanism which drives the creative understanding process. The knowledge
organization scheme presented facilitates this process and acts as a rational bound on the degree of creative
understanding which is attempted. Without the capability for creative understanding, a reading system will not
be able to achieve the same level of reading that a human is capable of.
The task of reading is so complex and so interconnected, the idea of developing an understanding of the
entire process seems, at times, a Sisyphean task. Perhaps this is why so many researchers are choosing to
concentrate on smaller sections of the problem and are staying away from the global questions. That approach
is respectable and will no doubt lead to significant results (as it already has in many cases). However, at some
level of thought in the researcher’s mind must exist a more global view of the process. Our theory provides
such a view. We see it acting as a scaffold around which various other theories can be built and supported. We
ourselves are working at a high point in the structure in the area of creative understanding.
The theory represents an integration and extension of a variety of results and evidence from past research
and our own work. Through a combination of psychological insights and an analysis of past and current reading
systems, we were able to develop the integrated, functional theory presented here. It is being implemented in
the ISAAC system, where we intend to implement as much of the global theory as possible to more accurately
model the human reading process, with emphasis placed on those aspects which will aid creative understanding.
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